

# Gender, Assertiveness, and Economic Decisions

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# Research Agenda

- Gender differences in labor market outcomes in the US persist:
  - Earnings gap: women earn approximately 78 cents for every dollar earned by a man (Goldin 2015)
  - Leadership gap: women make up only 4.2% of CEOs at S&P 500 firms, 19.2% of board members (Catalyst 2015)
  - Leaky pipelines in male-typed fields: for instance, in economics, women make up 30% of assistant professors, but only 12% of full professors (CSWEP 2014)

# Research Agenda

- Lots of explanations:
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  - differences in human capital accumulation
  - demand for flexibility
  - discrimination and stereotypes
  - gender differences in preferences

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  - differences in human capital accumulation
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  - gender differences in preferences

My work is focused on better understanding these two forces.

# Research Agenda

- Draw insights from field data on labor market outcomes and other economically-important contexts to inform research questions
- Design a carefully controlled laboratory environment that (i) can isolate the forces at work, (ii) measure the impact of those forces on the efficiency/equity of outcomes, (iii) test potential policy interventions

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**Today: Discuss one of my papers that exemplifies this approach**

# Willingness to guess

Baldiga (2014) in Management Science

In many important contexts, we face questions we aren't sure we know the answer to: the classroom, board meetings, job talks...

Our performance may depend on whether we're willing to guess

# Willingness to guess

For example, consider the SATs - standardized tests taken by high school juniors and seniors, important for college admissions

- Multiple choice questions: 5 possible answers
- Earn 1 point for a right answer, lose  $\frac{1}{4}$  point for a wrong answer, earn 0 points for a skipped question
- A risk neutral test-taker should always weakly prefer to guess

A strategy of skipping questions can be detrimental



# Willingness to guess

This project focuses on this test context and asks:

1. Do women skip more questions than men?
2. What factors inform the decision to skip a question?
  - Knowledge of the material?
  - Confidence?
  - Risk aversion?
3. How does skipping questions impact test scores?
4. Does eliminating the penalty for wrong answers eliminate the gender gap?

# Design

Part 1: SAT-style test with option to skip

- Use 20 Questions from College Board Practice Tests for World History and US History SAT II Tests
- Incentives:
  - Receive 1 point for a right answer
  - Receive 0 points for a skipped question
  - We randomly vary penalty for wrong answers across subject:
    - Lose **0**, or
    - Lose  $\frac{1}{4}$  point for a wrong answer

# Design

## Part 2: Measure risk preferences

- Subjects must accept/decline a series of 20 gambles structured to mimic part 1 questions
- Key: Declining a gamble that succeeds  $Y\%$  of time is like deciding to skip a question you are  $Y\%$  sure about

## Part 3: Repeat Part 1 test with forced response

- Revisit the same 20 SAT Questions from Part 1
- Each subject *must* provide an answer to each question
  - Provides a counterfactual that is unavailable in field data
- Also measure confidence in each answer

# Mean Number of Questions Skipped

	<b>Male Mean</b>	<b>Female Mean</b>	<b>p value</b>
<b>No Penalty</b>			
<b>Penalty</b>	1.06	2.04	0.03


# Mechanisms

We see a significant gender gap in questions skipped.

Why?

- Knowledge of the material?
- Confidence?
- Risk aversion?

# Knowledge of the Material



# Mechanisms


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Women skip more questions than men with similar levels of knowledge of the material

# Confidence





# Mechanisms


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# Risk Preferences



# Mechanisms

We see a significant gender gap in questions skipped.

Why?

- ~~Knowledge of the material?~~
- ~~Confidence?~~
- Risk aversion...

Risk preferences are a big part of the story: explain about half of the gender gap.

# Implications for Performance

- Conditional on performance under forced response, test-takers who skip questions do significantly worse on our Part 1 test
- Because they skip more questions, women score *half a point* worse than equally knowledgeable men on our 20 point test

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**Would a policy of removing the penalty for wrong answers eliminate the gender gap?**

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# Conclusions

## **Why should we care?**

- Penalties for wrong answers encourage risk averse test-takers and women to skip more questions
- Skipping questions can have a significant and negative impact on test scores
- This makes multiple-choice tests with penalties for wrong answers biased measures of knowledge

## **Possible policy recommendations**

- Remove the penalty for wrong answers
- This is what will be done on the SAT going forward (announced March 2014)