


DEMOCRACY AND LEGISLATIVE STUDIES




ARGELINA FIGUEIREDO
(UNICAMP, IESP/UERJ E CEBRAP)

FERNANDO LIMONGI
(USP, NECI E CEBRAP)







Transitions





Transition/Consolidation/Presidentialism





Presidentialism versus Parliamentarism

“When nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, they are choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously (...). Presidential and parliamentary systems come with their own baggage. They are package deals.(...)”

“Each institutional form is a full-blown system in the making. It comes with a built-in genetic code that programs the kinds of bureaucracies, leadership structures, personnel arrangements, and other properties that will ultimately make up its government. Once the form is adopted, the other properties follow. They are chosen by participants in its politics of structural choice, but the choices are predictable and highly constrained. They simply give expression to the genetic code.”

Moe, Terry M. and Michael Caldwell (1994: 172 & 192)



Law production by presidency: Brazil (1949-64 & 1989-2010)

President	President's party in the Lower House % seats	Government coalition in the Lower House % seats	Bills enacted (per month)	Executive success (%)	Executive dominance (%)
Dutra	52.8	74.0	26.3	30.0	34.2
Vargas	16.8	88.0	28.3	45.9	42.8
Café Filho	7.9	84.0	19.0	10.0	41.0
Nereu Ramos	33.9	66.0	26.3	9.8	39.2
Kubitschek	33.9	66.0	15.7	29.0	35.0
Quadros	2.1	93.0	9.1	0.80	48.3
Goulart*	23.5	72.0	3.2	19.4	40.6
Subtotal	24.3	77.1	18.2	29.5	38.5
Sarney	40.8	63.2	21.3	73.6	76.1
Collor	6.3	32.4	19.5	64.4	76.1
Franco	-	55.6	16.7	72.6	91.2
Cardoso I	12.9	63.8	16.3	80.9	83.3
Cardoso II	18.3	58.7	18.7	74.6	76.1
Lula I	16.3	56.3	16.7	79.1	75.0
Lula II	15.9	66.0	17.0	68.1	83.0
Subtotal	15.8	55.9	17.0	73.9	79.5




Legislative powers of the Executive according to Brazilian democratic constitutions

Executive power	1946 Constitution	1988 Constitution
To have exclusive initiative for:		
- “administrative” bills*	Yes	Yes
- budget bills	No	Yes
- tax bills	No	Yes
To enact decree with the force of law	No	Yes
To issue laws upon request of delegation by Congress	No	Yes
To declare bills urgent in which case they must be voted on in 45 days in each chamber	No	Yes
To impose restrictions on budget amendments by Congress	No	Yes



Coalitional Government: Presidential Support





Consequences

AGENDA POWERS OR LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AS WEAPONS OF THE MAJORITY

1. to avoid minorities' veto: to prevent that minority opposition parties or legislators block or defer majority decisions
2. to solve coalitional bargaining problems: to facilitate compromise over policies among coalition parties and to protect individual legislators in decisions that can harm their constituencies

Consequently, rather than being weapons of the president to bypass, circumvent or confront the legislature, agenda powers help the government to overcome legislator's collective action problems and to organize majority partisan support . It enables the majority to act and should not be interpreted differently in different forms of government.

That moves the research focus from the way governments are formed to the way they act.



Democracy and Legislative Studies

- THANKS

